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ABSTRACT State and local expenditure and tax revenue respond less to the
business cycle than do federal spending and revenue, thereby reducing the
countercyclicality of total government expenditure and revenue. This paper
considers forces responsible for the cyclical pattern of state expenditure and
revenue. Annual ﬂuctuations in state personal income are associated with
small changes in state spending and signiﬁcant changes in tax receipts; receipt
of federal grants is associated with greater state spending. Tax collections, and
to a lesser degree expenditure, of larger states are more closely associated 
with annual income ﬂuctuations than are the tax collections and expenditure of
smaller states. These state size differences may proxy for other state character-
istics, such as the extent to which a state faces interstate competition for
mobile businesses and individuals, and the quality of state government. The
spending and tax revenue of states with less mobile populations closely track
income ﬂuctuations, as does spending in states where convictions of public
ofﬁcials for federal corruption crimes are more common. In small states, and
in states with more mobile populations and better corruption records, govern-
ment expenditure and revenue appear to rise and fall less with income, and in
that respect more closely resemble the federal government.
I
n the United States, ﬁscal policy is the province not only of the federal
government but also of 50 state governments and their local govern-
ments. Collectively, these nonfederal governments accounted for roughly
40 percent of total government expenditure in 2007, and an even larger
fraction of total government revenue. Since states and municipalities oper-
ate independently of the federal government and of each other, it follows
that a signiﬁcant portion of U.S. ﬁscal policy is uncoordinated. As a result,
any deliberate countercyclical ﬁscal policy conducted by the federal gov-
ernment has the potential to be affected, possibly even undermined, by the
actions of state and local governments.
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economic consequence if states and localities behaved just like smaller
versions of the federal government, but there is little reason to expect them
to, and considerable evidence that they do not. States and localities differ
from the federal government and from each other in the economic func-
tions they serve, their average level and composition of expenditure, the
extent to which they are subject to national economic shocks, and their
beliefs about the role of government in managing the economy. Perhaps
most important, state and local decisionmaking is driven by interests and
constraints that differ from those of the federal government: states have
incentives to pursue policies that beneﬁt their own stakeholders, and they
are subject to competition from other states.
The aggregate evidence for the postwar period suggests that during eco-
nomic downturns, state and local tax collections decline less than do federal
tax collections, and state government spending expands less than does fed-
eral spending. This general pattern has been mirrored in the recent U.S.
experience. For example, in 2007 the federal government collected $1.638
trillion in taxes other than social insurance contributions, a ﬁgure that
declined substantially in the recent recession, to $1.142 trillion in 2009.
State and local tax collections also declined, but much more gradually:
from $1.314 trillion in 2007 to $1.267 trillion in 2009. Federal government
spending of $3.458 trillion in 2009 was $558 billion greater than in 2007,
whereas state and local spending of $2.026 trillion in 2009 exceeded 2007
spending by just $115 billion.
1 Changes in federal expenditure and in state
and local expenditure reﬂect policy changes as well as the changing incomes
of the population. In addition, federal grants-in-aid to state and local gov-
ernments rose by $104 billion between 2007 and 2009; removing this com-
ponent leaves self-ﬁnanced aggregate state expenditure only $11 billion
larger in nominal terms, and smaller in real terms, during 2009 than in 2007.
It is clear that state and local governments reacted to the recession that
began at the end of 2007 very differently than did the federal government.
There are reasons to expect states not to expand their spending during
recessions. Almost all state governments have annual balanced budget
requirements, with only limited exceptions for bad economic times, so the
declining tax revenue that characterizes most economic downturns is
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1. The state and local totals are the sum of state, county, city, and other local taxes and
spending. Federal and aggregate state and local government tax and expenditure data, both
at annual and quarterly frequencies, are drawn from the U.S. national income and product
accounts.
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requirements certainly do not prevent states from ﬁnancing additional
spending with greater borrowing, as evidenced by the fact that many states
do borrow, but the requirements raise the political and administrative
costs of running deficits, since they commonly require that state legisla-
tures enact extraordinary measures to undertake the necessary borrowing.
States with balanced budget requirements can maintain or expand spend-
ing across the cycle by running budget surpluses during good economic
times, which can then be drawn down during bad economic times, but in
practice it has proved difﬁcult for many states to conduct their ﬁscal affairs
that way. Finally, the adoption of balanced budget requirements reﬂects a
shared expectation among states that they will not make extensive use of
debt ﬁnance to combat adverse economic developments.
A second reason why state governments might fail to increase expendi-
ture during economic downturns is that the tax revenue reductions that
accompany economic contractions generally discourage spending even in
the absence of a requirement that budgets be balanced. It has been widely
documented that the expenditure of subnational governments is signiﬁ-
cantly affected by cash windfalls, whether positive or negative; this is
known as the “ﬂypaper effect”: money tends to stick where it hits. The ﬂy-
paper effect was ﬁrst observed in the context of intergovernmental grants,
typically those from the federal government to state governments, which
appeared to have a much greater impact on state spending than can be eas-
ily reconciled with the actual income and substitution effects of the grants.
There is considerable controversy over the origins of the ﬂypaper effect,
its magnitude, and whether it reﬂects political dynamics or more funda-
mental aspects of the way that individuals make decisions.
2 But whatever
its sources, the ﬂypaper effect describes an empirical regularity: money in
hand and available is more likely to be spent than is money that is not quite
as readily available, even though it is fully obtainable. Although the ﬂypa-
per effect is often interpreted narrowly to apply to speciﬁc categories of
revenue and expenditure, a more general view (see, for example, Hines
and Thaler 1995) is that it reﬂects a feature of human nature that applies
broadly to many revenue sources and expenditure categories, and results
from the difﬁculty that people have in not spending resources that are
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2. See, for example, Hines and Thaler (1995), Strumpf (1998), and Baicker (2005).
Knight (2002), Gordon (2004), and Lutz (2010) offer evidence and interpretations that the
magnitude of the ﬂypaper effect may be overstated by earlier studies that fail to control
properly for the endogeneity of grant receipts to spending levels, although even the data pre-
sented by Lutz (2010) appear to be consistent with signiﬁcant ﬂypaper effects.
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de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (1994) report that ﬁrms obtaining cash
windfalls from victorious lawsuits signiﬁcantly increased their expenditure
on acquisitions of other ﬁrms; and in the context of state reactions to eco-
nomic ﬂuctuations, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Whitney Newey, and Harvey
Rosen (1989) ﬁnd that local revenue shocks are associated with subse-
quent spending increases by municipal governments. Any natural ten-
dency of state governments to spend money that they have on hand reduces
the likelihood that states will pursue countercyclical ﬁscal policies.
3
Against these considerations, however, must be set the potential bene-
ﬁts of greater spending, including the avoidance of draconian budget cuts,
during economic downturns. To the extent that tax cuts and greater gov-
ernment spending during recessions facilitate the employment of under-
utilized resources within a state, they have the potential to promote the
welfare of state residents.
4 Apart from any desire to put underutilized
resources to work, states that can avoid damaging, cash ﬂow–driven budget
cuts during bad economic times have the potential to improve their own
business conditions and property values. This may matter more for smaller
(that is, less populous) states than for larger states: since they tend to face
the most elastic populations of businesses and individuals, they may have
the strongest incentives to avoid boom-and-bust ﬁscal cycles that, to the
extent that they are inefﬁcient or reduce welfare, could result in declining
populations, incomes, and property values.
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3. An additional reason why states might reduce expenditure during recessions is that
state spending becomes more expensive, on an after-federal-tax basis, to the degree that
fewer taxpayers itemize deductions or that those who do itemize face lower marginal tax
rates. The ability of taxpayers who itemize on their federal income tax returns to take deduc-
tions for state and local income and property tax payments generally reduces the after-tax
cost of state spending, and thereby encourages state governments to spend more than they
would were state taxes nondeductible (Feldstein and Metcalf 1987). Given that only roughly
one-third of American taxpayers itemize their deductions, however, and that the fraction
itemizing does not appear to fall systematically during recessions (the numbers of taxpayers
itemizing deductions rose during the 1980, 1991–92, and 2001 recessions, according to IRS
data: “SOI Bulletin Historical Table 7,” www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=175812,00.html),
the effect of tax deductibility on state expenditure is unlikely to account for signiﬁcant
expenditure reactions to economic downturns.
4. There is enormous controversy over the extent to which countercyclical ﬁscal policy
inﬂuences the employment of resources during economic downturns. See, for example,
Auerbach, Gale, and Harris (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), Barro and Redlick
(2009), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Cogan and others (2010), Hall (2009), Romer and
Romer (2010), and Woodford (2010). Gramlich (1997) identiﬁes circumstances in which
state governments might beneﬁt from expanding the employment of underutilized resources
through expansionary ﬁscal policies, and Bahl (1984) reviews older evidence of the associa-
tion of state tax and spending policies and business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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ation vary over the business cycle. Changes in the expenditure and tax
revenue of larger states are more positively correlated with state income
fluctuations than are those of smaller states. This fiscal pattern of large
versus small states may reflect the pressures that all governments face to
spend money during the good times when it is available, and reduce
expenditure at other times; the somewhat greater immobility of population
and business activity in large states arguably makes it more feasible for
their governments to follow such spending patterns than it is for smaller
jurisdictions. Expenditure and tax revenue in states with less mobile popu-
lations (where mobility is measured by the fraction of adults born in a state
who subsequently reside there), and in states whose public ofﬁcials are fre-
quently convicted of federal corruption crimes, exhibit correlations with
income ﬂuctuations similar to those of large states. This suggests that state
size might proxy in these regressions for other attributes of larger states,
such as relatively more captive populations of individuals and businesses,
and perhaps lower quality of government.
Section I of this paper uses quarterly national income accounts data
(available for states only as an aggregate) from 1947 to 2010 to identify the
extent to which state and local tax revenue and spending change during
national income fluctuations. This evidence suggests that the 2007–09
experience is unusual only in its magnitude: real federal tax collections per
capita tend to decline in years in which the economy performs poorly,
whereas state and local tax collections are much more stable; furthermore,
federal government spending tends to rise more rapidly during bad eco-
nomic times than it does during good times, a pattern that is much less
evident among state and local governments.
Section II of the paper uses Census of Governments data to identify the
determinants of state tax and spending patterns, distinguishing between
large and small states. States exhibit marked propensities to spend out of
federal grant dollars, and larger states display tax revenue and expenditure
patterns that are more closely associated with income ﬂuctuations than are
those of smaller states. Section III concludes.
I. Aggregate Patterns of Federal and State 
Taxes and Spending
Expenditure by the federal government accounts for about 20 percent of
aggregate national expenditure in virtually every year since World War II.
Figure 1 depicts ratios of real federal spending and of real state and local
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account data from 1947Q1 to 2010Q1.
5 It is noteworthy that federal spend-
ing as a fraction of GDP appears to rise with the onset of recessions, par-
ticularly since the 1960s. Doubtless recessions have this effect for multiple
reasons, including not only that the federal government pursues a deliber-
ately countercyclical ﬁscal policy, but also that a sluggish responsiveness
of federal expenditure to changes in income means that the ratio rises when
GDP fails to grow as rapidly as anticipated. Ratios of state and local
expenditure to GDP appear to exhibit a similar pattern of rising in reces-
sions, although from visual inspection it is not clear whether they do so to
the same degree as federal expenditure. Certainly state and local spending
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5. GDP, federal taxes, and state and local taxes are deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator.
Government consumption and investment expenditures are separately deﬂated using the cor-
responding deﬂators, and all other categories of government expenditure (transfer payments,







Source: National income and product accounts.
a.  Shading indicates recessions as identified by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
1955 1975 2005 1965 1985  1995
State and local
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Figure 1. Federal Spending and State and Local Spending, 1947Q1–2010Q1a
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But since the latest recession is just one of several postwar recessions, it is
useful to consider how state and local spending and federal spending have
responded in others.
Table 1 presents averages of quarterly growth rates of real federal gov-
ernment and aggregate state and local government tax revenue and spend-
ing per capita.
7 These growth rates are calculated as ﬁrst differences of the
logarithms of seasonally adjusted quarterly values. Table entries are cell
means; thus, for example, the ﬁrst column indicates that, in quarters in
which the output gap declined, the log of real federal income tax collec-
tions per capita rose by an average of 0.0177. Strictly speaking, this corre-
sponds to a growth rate of 1.79 percent, but as a convenient approximation,
these log differences are commonly interpreted as percentage growth rates.
The output gap is the difference between the economy’s potential GDP and
actual GDP, divided by potential GDP, as reported by the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce.
The evidence in table 1 suggests that the cyclical patterns of U.S. fed-
eral tax and spending policies differ from those of state and local govern-
ments. In quarters during which the economy is expanding and the output
gap is narrowing, the mean growth rate of real federal tax revenue per
capita is 1.77 percent, whereas in quarters during which the output gap is
widening, the mean growth rate of this revenue measure is −1.16 percent.
State and local tax collections, by contrast, show a more muted difference,
growing at a quarterly average rate of 1.13 percent when the output gap
narrows and 0.27 percent when it widens. The last three columns of table 1
show that during recession quarters (as identiﬁed by the Business Cycle
Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research), the
mean growth rate of real federal tax revenue per capita is −2.91 percent,
whereas at other times the mean growth rate is 1.08 percent; state and
local tax revenue grew by an average of −0.02 percent during recession
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6. Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) compare recent levels of certain (nontransfer) state
and federal spending categories with levels predicted from a simple time-series model and
argue that discretionary state ﬁscal policy is by this measure so contractionary that it roughly
offsets the recent federal expansion. This conclusion appears to depend critically on the
model used to predict discretionary spending; but almost any measure shows that state
spending failed to expand during the 2007–09 recession, which suggests that states did not
pursue active countercyclical policies.
7. Variables are converted to per capita terms using quarterly interpolations of annual
population data from the U.S. Census.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 320quarters, and 0.93 percent at other times. As the table indicates, these dif-
ferences between federal and state and local tax revenue growth are statis-
tically as well as quantitatively signiﬁcant.
Federal spending tends to rise more rapidly when the economy is per-
forming poorly than when it is performing well; state and local spending
exhibits a similar pattern, but to a much smaller degree. Table 1 presents
ﬁgures for federal nondefense expenditure, a portion of the federal budget
that is less subject than total expenditure to exogenous shocks and more
amenable to deliberate adjustment in response to changing macroeco-
nomic conditions. Real federal nondefense spending per capita rose by a
mean of 1.49 percent during quarters in which potential GDP exceeded
actual, and at other times fell by an average of 0.01 percent. State and local
government real expenditure per capita rose by an average of 0.60 percent
during quarters in which potential GDP exceeded the actual; it also rose,
by an average of 0.57 percent, at other times. As indicated in table 1, the
relationship between federal expenditure growth and the output gap dif-
fers statistically from that between the growth of state and local spending
and the output gap. The differences between federal and state and local
spending growth during rising and falling output gaps, and during NBER-
deﬁned recessions, are not signiﬁcant but point in the same direction: fed-
eral spending generally expands more than does state and local spending
during difficult economic times.
In interpreting the evidence in table 1, it is important to bear in mind
that these patterns reﬂect not only the degree to which the state of the econ-
omy may inﬂuence government tax and expenditure choices, but also the
impact of taxes and government expenditure on economic performance.
The federal government is larger, in terms of both revenue and spending,
than the 50 state governments combined, and it is more likely to coordinate
ﬁscal and monetary policy; as a result, federal actions have greater poten-
tial to inﬂuence the course of the economy. A simple interpretation of the
means in table 1 might take the output gap and the cyclical status of the
economy to be unaffected by government tax and spending changes, which
is inaccurate if federal economic management is effective, and particularly
if taxes and spending are coordinated with other government policies. To
the extent that federal tax reductions and spending increases reduce the
severity of economic downturns, simple interpretations of the statistics in
table 1 understate the extent to which the federal government actively
manages taxation and spending in response to underlying economic condi-
tions. The same argument applies to state and local governments, although
their smaller aggregate size gives it somewhat less signiﬁcance. Further-
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gate demand during downturns is by using federal grant dollars and other
inducements to encourage states to spend money; thus, some federal
spending is effectively channeled through the states and appears as state
expenditure even though it is largely federally determined.
Differences between federal ﬁscal policy and the ﬁscal policies of state
and local governments reﬂect many considerations, including the federal
government’s explicit mandate to manage the economy over the business
cycle, and the ability and desire of state governments to react to changing
economic circumstances. Since states are heterogeneous, it is potentially
instructive to compare the ﬁscal policies of states with differing character-
istics, in order to identify factors that may contribute to the determination
of overall state policies.
II. Understanding State Fiscal Policy
In the absence of countervailing policy action, tax revenue generally
increases as incomes rise, creating opportunities for states to fund greater
expenditure. A close connection between income changes and expenditure
changes could, of course, constitute efﬁcient state ﬁscal policy, although it
also is characteristic of the ﬂypaper effect as applied to state ﬁnances. To
the extent that the ﬂypaper effect is behavioral, ﬁscal policies driven by
ﬂypaper considerations are potentially costly from an efﬁciency stand-
point. Small jurisdictions generally have the most elastic tax bases (Buco-
vetsky 1991, Kanbur and Keen 1993, Wilson and Wildasin 2004) and
therefore face signiﬁcant costs of adopting suboptimal policies that may
chase away their business and individual populations. The very fact that
adopting inefﬁcient policies is so expensive has the potential to discipline
politics in these smaller states to avoid some of the behavioral inefﬁcien-
cies that could persist among their larger neighbors whose tax bases are
more secure.
In evaluating state ﬁscal policy, then, it is instructive to distinguish
between smaller and larger states in analyzing the impact of income ﬂuctu-
ations on taxes and expenditure. For that purpose it is necessary to use data
from the Census of Governments. These data are available from 1951 to
2007 for the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia; coverage of
Alaska and Hawaii is more limited, both in years and in data items, and so
these states are omitted from the analysis. The data include information 
on state government expenditure, state personal incomes, populations,
receipts of grants from the federal government, and collections of major
322 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
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not use data on city, county, or other local taxes and spending, since the
purpose is to analyze the determinants of taxes and spending at the state
level. Personal income and state tax collections are converted to real 2005
dollars using the GDP deﬂator, and state government expenditure is con-
verted to real 2005 dollars using the Bureau of Economic Analysis price
index for state and local government consumption expenditure and gross
investment; all variables are measured in per capita terms.
The state regressions include interactions between balanced budget
requirements and changes in state incomes. Every state except Vermont
has a formal requirement that its budget be balanced on an annual basis.
However, these requirements vary considerably in their ability to constrain
state legislatures, a fact that has permitted analysts to evaluate their impact
by comparing the experiences of states with strict balanced budget laws
with those that have more leeway to run deﬁcits. Earlier research (for
example, Poterba 1994, Alt and Lowry 1994) ﬁnds that states with more
binding balanced budget requirements react to ﬁscal crises (variously
deﬁned) differently than do states with less binding requirements, although
the reactions appear to be idiosyncratic in that they are inﬂuenced by local
politics.
Poterba (1994, 1997), Von Hagen (1991), and numerous other studies
use the characterization of state budget stringency from the now-defunct
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as their source of
variation in state budget rules. In the simplest of these classiﬁcations,
roughly half of the states are classiﬁed as having “strict” rules, with
requirements that entail, if necessary, mid-year budget adjustments and
actions by state executive agencies that make it politically costly (although
by no means impossible) to run deﬁcits. The regressions reported in tables
2, 3, and 4 include this variable interacted with changes in real state
income per capita.
Columns 2-1 and 2-2 of table 2 report regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the first difference of the log of real state expenditure.
The regressions include a complete set of year and state dummy variables.
State population is entered as the difference between a state’s share of
the U.S. population and the sample mean of 0.0204; all other indepen-
dent variables are entered as first differences in time. The estimated
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8. Data on detailed categories of state government expenditure are not available for
2007. Annual state populations are available from the Census.
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Table 2. Regressions Explaining Annual Changes in State Spending and Tax Revenue
Dependent variablea
Δ log spending Δ log tax revenue
Independent variableb 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4
Δ income
c −0.0159 0.119** 0.368*** 0.367***
(0.0695) (0.0588) (0.0836) (0.0836)
Δ income−1 0.0691 0.101* 0.299*** 0.304***
(0.0598) (0.0593) (0.0551) (0.0591)
Balanced budget req.
d ×Δincome 0.00715 −0.0160 −0.0644 −0.0618
(0.0798) (0.0709) (0.107) (0.107)
Balanced budget req. ×Δincome−1 0.0186 0.00722 0.0796 0.0769
(0.0988) (0.0935) (0.0723) (0.0726)
Population
e ×Δincome −2.261 −0.740 9.975*** 10.30***
(1.953) (1.751) (2.636) (2.757)
Population ×Δincome−1 4.714** 4.778** 4.881*** 4.847**
(2.066) (2.237) (1.795) (1.888)
Population −1.374 1.170 −8.162** −8.534**
(3.788) (3.194) (3.998) (4.140)
Population−1 1.675 −0.941 8.235** 8.600**




Δ grants-income ratio−1 0.606* 0.00611
(0.311) (0.361)
Population ×Δgrants-income ratio 98.88** 17.53
(39.82) (20.58)
Population ×Δgrants-income ratio−1 −2.500 −14.55
(9.095) (12.44)
R
2 0.279 0.348 0.270 0.270
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Dependent variables are annual log changes in real state government spending or tax revenue per
capita. All regressions include state and year ﬁxed effects. Sample size is 2,695 in all regressions. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
b. Variables subscripted “−1” are one-year lags.
c. Annual change in the log of real state personal income per capita.
d. Dummy variable equal to 1 for states with a strict annual balanced budget requirement, and zero 
otherwise.
e. Difference between the state’s population as a fraction of total U.S. population and the sample mean
of 0.0204.
f. Annual change in the ratio of federal grants to state personal income.
coefficients on the differences in log real income per capita (−0.0159),
and its one-year lag (0.0691), in the regression in column 2-1, together
imply that a 1 percent increase in income (measured as a deviation from
the national average) in a state with population equal to the sample
mean and no strict balanced budget requirement is accompanied by 
a 0.0532 percent rise in state spending. This is a very small effect, 
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income changes have little average effect on state spending. The small
size of the association may reflect a combination of deliberate counter-
cyclical policy and sluggishness in adjusting spending to genuine income
changes, together with any measurement error in state personal income.
The positive coefficients on the interactions of the balanced budget
requirement with the change in income in column 2-1 are consistent with
expenditure by states with strict budgetary rules tracking state income
changes more closely than does expenditure by other states. However,
the small magnitudes and statistical insignificance of the coefficients
suggest that balanced budget rules do not have powerful average effects
over the sample period.
The coefﬁcient on the interaction between (de-meaned) state population
and the one-year-lagged change in income in column 2-1 (4.714) indicates
that government spending by larger states is more positively associated
with once-lagged income ﬂuctuations than is government spending by
smaller states. The negative coefﬁcient on contemporaneous income
changes in the same column (−2.261) implies, however, that this associa-
tion is mitigated by effects in the ﬁrst year; the sum of these coefﬁcients is
2.453, with a standard error of 2.689. The regression reported in column 2-2
adds as explanatory variables the first difference of the ratio of grants
received from the federal government to state personal income, the inter-
action of this variable with de-meaned state population, and lags of these
two variables. The effect on spending of population interacted with lagged
income changes continues to be positive, although the sum of this coefﬁ-
cient and the unlagged corresponding term is 4.038, with a standard error
of 2.938 that makes it insigniﬁcant.
Intergovernmental grants have the expected positive effect in the
regression reported in column 2-2, the coefﬁcients together implying that a
state with mean population increases its expenditure by 5.468 percent as
grants increase by 1 percent of state income. One way to interpret the
impact of intergovernmental grants is to specify the change in state spend-
ing as a function of the change in state personal income and grant receipts:
in which St is state expenditure in year t, yt is state personal income in year
t, gt is government grant receipts in year t, and Δ is the ﬁrst difference oper-
ator. The parameter γ reﬂects the fact that government grants may not
affect spending to the same extent that personal income does; values of 
( ) ln ln , 1 ΔΔ S yg tt t =+ ( ) βγ
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rewritten as
Using a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation to the second term on the right
side of equation 2, evaluated at the mean value of  , denoted  , 
produces
Column 2-2 presents estimated coefﬁcients from a state spending regres-
sion that includes  as an explanatory variable. Equation 3 implies that
the ratio of the sum of grant effects (5.468) for a state with mean popula-
tion to the sum of income effects for a state without a strict balanced bud-
get requirement (0.22), which is 24.9, should equal  , or (given
the very small size of government grants relative to income) approxi-
mately γ. The estimates therefore imply that a dollar of grant receipt has
about the same impact on state government spending as $25 in additional
state personal income per capita, which, if taken literally, implies that the
marginal propensity to spend out of grant income is in the neighborhood of
80 percent.9 This clearly reﬂects not only the signiﬁcant effects that grants
have on spending levels, but also that grant receipts are inﬂuenced by state
spending levels, sometimes on a one-for-one basis. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that the 98.88 coefﬁcient on the interaction of state population and
federal grants suggests that whatever the process is that determines the
association of state spending and federal grants, this process appears to
operate more strongly for large states than for small states. This is consis-
tent with a greater willingness of large states to spend out of transitory
income, although it may also reﬂect aspects of the grant allocation process
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9. The 0.220 estimated income elasticity in column 2-2, together with the 0.1475 mean
ratio of state spending to state personal income, implies that, evaluated at the mean, the mar-
ginal propensity to spend by state government out of a dollar of personal income is
(0.22)(0.15) = 0.033. Then (25)(0.033) = 0.825.
12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 326that somehow reward expenditure by large states more than expenditure by
small states.
Columns 2-3 and 2-4 of table 2 present estimated coefﬁcients from
regressions in which the dependent variable is the ﬁrst difference of the log
of state tax revenue, and the independent variables are the same as those
used in the regressions reported in columns 2-1 and 2-2. State tax revenue
rises with income: the sum of the ﬁrst two coefﬁcients in column 2-3 indi-
cates that for a state with mean population and no strict balanced budget
requirement, income growth by 1 percent is associated with 0.667 per-
cent tax revenue growth. The significant positive coefficients on the
interactions of population and the change in state personal income (current
and lagged) imply that rising income is more strongly associated with
increased tax collections in larger than in smaller states. This is consistent
with the less statistically powerful evidence in columns 2-1 and 2-2 that
expenditure of larger states exhibits stronger income associations than
does expenditure of smaller states. The coefﬁcients imply that increasing
the size of an average state by 1 percent of the U.S. population increases
the estimated tax revenue change associated with a 1 percent income ﬂuc-
tuation by 22 percent (from 0.667 percent to 0.816 percent). Including fed-
eral grants as explanatory variables in the regression reported in column
2-4 has little effect on these estimates, and the coefﬁcients on grants are
much smaller in magnitude than are the corresponding coefﬁcients in col-
umn 2-2, notably failing to indicate that the spending effects of grants are
crowded out through tax reductions.
It is possible to estimate state-specific income sensitivities of govern-
ment expenditure and tax collections using a modified version of the
specification reported in columns 2-2 and 2-4 that substitutes for the
terms Δ income, Δ income−1, population ×Δincome, and population ×
Δ income−1 a complete set of state dummy variables interacted with the
sum of the change in log state personal income and its lag. The estimated
coefﬁcients on these interactions, plotted against state population in the top
panel of ﬁgure 2, capture the extent to which the expenditures of different
states respond to income changes. California, Massachusetts, Virginia, and
Wisconsin exhibit the greatest sensitivity of state government spending to
state personal income, and Delaware and Kansas the least. The bottom
panel of figure 2 reveals that California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia exhibit the greatest sensitivity of tax collections to state personal
income, and Delaware and Nebraska are the least sensitive. The figure
shows considerable variation across states for both revenue and spending
sensitivity but suggests a general positive relationship between both and
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a. State-specific coefficient on the change in real state personal income per capita in a regression in
which the dependent variable is the quarterly change in log state expenditure (top panel) or in log state
tax revenue (bottom panel). The regression uses the same specification as in column 2-2 of table 2 but
substitutes state-specific interactions with the change in income variable for the terms ∆ income, ∆


































































































Figure 2. State Size and Income Sensitivity of State Spending and Tax Revenue
12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:25 AM  Page 328state population, with no obvious outliers responsible for the estimation
results. As a robustness check, the regressions reported in columns 2-2
and 2-4 were rerun dropping potentially important single states, including
California, but the impact on the size and significance of the regression
estimates was small.
Further evidence comes from distinguishing state expenditure by func-
tion and state tax revenue by source. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns of table 3 report
estimated coefﬁcients from regressions in which the dependent variables
are log changes in real expenditure per capita on education, health and hos-
pitals, public welfare, highways and roads, and unemployment insurance.
These are the ﬁve largest state government spending categories; education
and public welfare alone accounted for more than half of total state spend-
ing in 2006. In these regressions there is a mild association of spending
and intergovernmental grants, particularly in the categories of health and
hospitals, public welfare, and highways, for which the federal government
makes available substantial matching grants. However, the grants variable
used in these regressions is total grants received by states; the grants 
are not distinguished by category, in an effort to avoid the most obvious
sources of endogeneity.
The coefﬁcients reported in these ﬁrst ﬁve columns of table 3 imply that
interactions of state population shares and income changes have sizable
positive effects on the growth rates of education and health and hospital
spending, and large but statistically insigniﬁcant effects on the growth rate
of public welfare spending. In the case of education, the sum of the coefﬁ-
cients on current and lagged income changes interacted with population
share is 12.863 (with a standard error of 3.846), which implies that increas-
ing the size of an average state by 1 percent of the U.S. population is
associated with roughly one-third greater income sensitivity of education
spending. In the case of health and hospitals, the sum of the population and
income interaction coefﬁcients is 12.331 (with a standard error of 5.987),
which, together with the income coefﬁcients, implies that increasing the
size of an average state by 1 percent of the U.S. population is associated
with a 26 percent greater income sensitivity of health and hospital expen-
diture. The sums of the estimated coefﬁcients on the population-income
interaction are negative (but insigniﬁcant) in the case of highway spending
and unemployment insurance, the latter of which expands during eco-
nomic downturns. In the interpretation that larger states display greater
spending responsiveness to transitory income ﬂuctuations, it might be
expected that changes in unemployment insurance expenditure, which are
negatively associated with income changes, should react with greater mag-
nitude in large states.
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12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 330The last four columns of table 3 report coefficients from regressions
in which the dependent variables are log changes in real individual
income tax collections per capita, corporate tax collections, sales tax col-
lections, and property tax collections. Not all states use all of these
taxes—a fact reflected in the varying sample sizes. Among these taxes,
corporate and sales tax collections display significant associations with
income fluctuations, although the point estimate of income effects on
property taxes is large, with a very large standard error. Only in the indi-
vidual income tax regression is there a significant effect of the interac-
tion between population size and current plus lagged income changes
(the sum of current and lagged coefficients is 20.51, with an associated
standard error of 8.00); corporate income tax revenue also has a large
estimated effect (23.76) but with a large standard error (15.70). As a
practical matter, the differing income sensitivities associated with differ-
ent state taxes make it feasible for state governments to select revenue
sources that tailor their revenue streams, within limits, to desired tax col-
lections as incomes fluctuate.
The associations of state size with expenditure and tax responsiveness
to changes in state incomes (and changes in federal grant receipts) raise
the possibility that other variables correlated with state size may be
responsible for this pattern. To the extent that state size matters because
larger states have less mobile populations, direct measures of U.S. popu-
lation mobility might be used in place of state size; and if larger states
tend to have more dysfunctional governments, then measures of state
government corruption might also be used. D’Vera Cohn and Rich Morin
(2008) report the fractions of adult Americans born in each state who con-
tinued to live in their state of birth during 2005-07; their ﬁgures are repro-
duced as appendix table 1. (The ﬁgures should be interpreted to mean
that, for example, 69 percent of current American adults who were born in
California continued to live there during 2005–07.) Edward Glaeser and
Raven Saks (2006) report average annual convictions of state public ofﬁ-
cials for federal corruption-related crimes per 100,000 state residents
between 1976 and 2002; these data do not include ﬁgures for the District
of Columbia.
Table 4 presents regressions with the same specifications as those 
in table 2 but adding as independent variables interactions of measures
of population mobility and state corruption with income fluctuations.
(Mobility and corruption are time-invariant measures for each state and
therefore not included as independent variables.) The results suggest that
the results reported above for state size may partially reﬂect the impact of
JAMES R. HINES JR. 331
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Table 4. Regressions Investigating the Effect of Population Mobility and
Corruption on State Spending and Tax Revenue
Dependent variablea
Δ log spending Δ log tax revenue
Independent variable 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4
Δ income −0.00499 0.145** 0.480*** −0.482***
(0.0607) (0.0592) (0.0666) (0.0712)
Δ income−1 0.165* 0.165* 0.305 0.306***
(0.0843) (0.0849) (0.0646) (0.0690)
Balanced budget req. ×− 0.0142 −0.0372 −0.133* −0.132*
Δ income (0.0689) (0.0638) (0.0761) (0.0764)
Balanced budget req. ×− 0.0528 −0.0454 0.0619 0.0600
Δ income−1 (0.0939) (0.0922) (0.0735) (0.0742)
Population
e ×Δincome −5.297 −3.840 3.236 3.354
(3.245) (2.932) (2.350) (2.420)
Population ×Δincome−1 −1.157 0.307 4.170* 4.115
(3.134) (3.145) (2.368) (2.490)
Immobility
b ×Δincome 1.269** 0.920** 1.983*** 2.016***
(0.520) (0.453) (0.385) (0.386)
Immobility ×Δincome−1 1.617*** 0.894 0.363 0.341
(0.580) (0.608) (0.418) (0.450)
Corruption
c ×Δincome 0.616** 0.592** −0.320 −0.327
(0.245) (0.224) (0.284) (0.285)
Corruption ×Δincome−1 −0.158 −0.251 −0.0226 −0.0159
(0.334) (0.357) (0.281) (0.282)
Population −1.956 1.478 −7.909* −8.298*
(4.000) (3.304) (4.060) (4.205)
Population−1 2.437 −1.068 8.147** 8.537**
(4.019) (3.250) (4.036) (4.188)
Δ grants-income ratio 5.703*** 0.121
(0.572) (0.528)
Δ grants-income ratio−1 0.743** −0.0774
(0.290) (0.431)
Population ×Δgrants- 56.63** 15.45
income ratio (28.26) (22.60)
Population ×Δgrants- −3.067 −17.70
income ratio−1 (10.09) (13.80)
R2 0.304 0.372 0.278 0.278
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Dependent variables are annual log changes in real state government spending or tax revenue
per capita. All regressions include state and year ﬁxed effects. Sample size is 2,640 in all regressions.
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. See table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables
not deﬁned below.
b. Difference between the fraction of adults born in the state who lived there in 2005–07 and
the sample mean of 0.5741.
c. Difference between the average annual number of federal corruption convictions of state
government ofﬁcials per 100,000 state residents during 1976–2002 and the sample mean of 0.2709.
12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 332population mobility; the evidence is weaker in the case of state govern-
ment performance. In the regression reported in column 4-1, the estimated
effect of the interaction of state mobility and income ﬂuctuations is large
and statistically signiﬁcant (the sum of the coefﬁcients is 2.89, with a
standard error of 0.51), indicating that expenditure by states with less
mobile populations is more closely associated with income ﬂuctuations
than is expenditure by states with more mobile populations. The inter-
action of corruption and income changes is positive and significant for
contemporaneous income changes, but not for the sum of current and
lagged changes; the sum of the coefﬁcients on contemporaneous and
lagged interactions of population and income changes is also insigniﬁ-
cant. Similar results appear with the introduction of the grants variables in
the regression reported in column 4-2 and for the tax regressions reported
in columns 4-3 and 4-4.
Measured immobility as reported in appendix table 1 has a correlation
of 0.53 with state population shares, which in part explains why the popu-
lation mobility effects in the regressions reported in table 4 look similar to
those reported for state size in table 2. Since population mobility is poten-
tially inﬂuenced by state ﬁscal policies, it may be problematic to treat these
variables as strictly exogenous—but the same is true of state population. In
both cases there is reason to expect these variables to be related to the
underlying mobility of the population, but it is very difﬁcult to distinguish
the effect of state size per se from the effects of any other variables that are
strongly correlated with state size.
III. Conclusion
Tax revenue of state and local governments is more robust in economic
downturns than is federal tax revenue, whereas state and local government
spending grows at a slower rate in downturns than does federal spending.
It is tempting to attribute much of this pattern to choices made long ago
about the respective tax bases of federal and subfederal governments.
States and localities rely to a much greater extent than does the federal
government on property taxes and expenditure-type taxes such as sales and
excise taxes, whereas the federal government depends more on income and
payroll taxes. State and local revenue might as a result be more stable over
the business cycle, and although this does not explain differences in expen-
diture patterns, it offers a plausible explanation of patterns of tax receipts.
One difﬁculty with this interpretation is that property taxes, which are used
almost exclusively by state and local governments, do not appear to be less
JAMES R. HINES JR. 333
12367-06a_Hines-rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 333sensitive to income ﬂuctuations than are income taxes; a second is that
local, state, and federal governments are entitled to change their funding
models at any time if they are dissatisﬁed with the revenue streams they
produce.
It is perhaps surprising that larger states do not have spending and tax
policies that more closely resemble those of the federal government, since
they are closer in size to the nation as a whole than are smaller states, and
their governments may be closer in character to the federal government.
Also, as Edward Gramlich (1997) and others note, states—particularly
large states—may be able to internalize a large share of the beneﬁts of
stimulating their economies when there are underutilized resources. To the
extent that larger states have less mobile populations, they are less subject
to the point raised by Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) that interstate
worker mobility quickly mitigates adverse state economic outcomes (how-
ever, see Rowthorn and Glyn 2006 for a contrary interpretation of the evi-
dence). The logic of this argument implies that states with more mobile
populations might get smaller returns from trying to increase demand 
for local factors. Yet the evidence suggests otherwise and therefore may
reﬂect either additional economic considerations or a failure of govern-
ment optimization.
To the extent that there are national externalities associated with state
and local ﬁscal policies, the federal government has instruments at its dis-
posal that can inﬂuence patterns of state and local taxes and spending. The
most powerful of these is the provision of grants to state governments.
There is ample evidence that state spending is inﬂuenced by federal grants,
so a carefully tailored countercyclical grant policy has the potential to
encourage states, acting on their own behalf, to behave in a manner that
effectively incorporates the interests of other states in stimulating the
economy when resources are otherwise underutilized.
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Table A1. Interstate Population Mobility, 2005–07
Percent of adults  Percent of adults 
born in the state born in the state 
State now living there State now living there
Alabama 63.7 Montana 47.1
Alaska 28.2 Nebraska 50.2
Arizona 61.5 Nevada 48.7
Arkansas 54.5 New Hampshire 52.8
California 69.0 New Jersey 55.6
Colorado 54.7 New Mexico 53.5
Connecticut 57.1 New York 55.5
Delaware 54.0 North Carolina 71.4
District of Columbia 13.0 North Dakota 40.4
Florida 66.0 Ohio 65.1
Georgia 69.6 Oklahoma 55.6
Hawaii 57.3 Oregon 59.2
Idaho 48.6 Pennsylvania 63.8
Illinois 59.0 Rhode Island 53.9
Indiana 62.8 South Carolina 66.0
Iowa 54.0 South Dakota 43.4
Kansas 50.2 Tennessee 66.7
Kentucky 62.6 Texas 75.8
Louisiana 64.4 Utah 66.1
Maine 55.3 Vermont 52.5
Maryland 61.1 Virginia 61.9
Massachusetts 58.7 Washington 64.3
Michigan 67.5 West Virginia 48.9
Minnesota 66.3 Wisconsin 68.6
Mississippi 54.9 Wyoming 35.7
Missouri 61.9
Source: Cohn and Morin (2008).
APPENDIX
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COMMENT BY
WILLIAM G. GALE The Great Recession and the associated ﬁscal pol-
icy responses in many countries have renewed research interest in the
effects of activist fiscal stabilization and stimulus policies (Auerbach,
Gale, and Harris 2010). This paper by James Hines addresses an important
but often underanalyzed component of that issue, the role of subnational
governments.
In the United States, state and federal governments can have impor-
tant influences on overall fiscal stimulus for at least three reasons. First,
these governments’ spending and taxes, which equaled 14 percent and 
9 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2009, are sizable relative to those of
the federal government. Second, almost all states have balanced budget
rules. When revenue falls during a recession, states must either draw
down their rainy-day funds, raise taxes, or cut spending; the latter two
options are likely to act as procyclical policies that could exacerbate the
downturn. James Poterba (1994), for example, finds strong evidence that
states contract spending and raise taxes when faced with a negative fis-
cal shock. He also finds that states with stricter budget rules (for exam-
ple, those that apply to the enacted budget, rather than just the proposed
budget) respond to unexpected deficits by reducing spending much more
than other states.
Third, one federal stimulus option—besides raising government pur-
chases, raising transfers to individuals or businesses, or cutting taxes—
is to provide transfers to the states, which could ease their balanced
budget constraints and reduce the need for contractionary state re-
sponses. Although the argument that transfers to states are stimulative is
338
12367-06b_Hines-Comments.qxd  2/17/11  10:04 AM  Page 338COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 339
plausible, there is surprisingly little evidence on their countercyclical
effects.1
Edward Gramlich (1978, 1979) and Robert Reischauer (1978) evalu-
ate the effects of three federal grant programs undertaken in response to
the 1973–75 recession. One program offered countercyclical revenue to
the states in the form of block grants, another paid the salaries of state
and local government workers, and a third contributed funding for capital
improvements. The general ﬁnding was that states’ short-run response to
this federal aid was primarily to bolster their rainy-day funds; increases
in outlays and reductions in taxes were modest in the short run. The
long-run response—particularly in the form of decreased income tax
revenue—was substantial but materialized after the recession had ended.
It is unclear how relevant these findings are to the current economic
downturn, however, given the dated nature of the evidence, differences
between the 1975 economy and today’s, and differences between the
states’ economic situations then and now: in the current downturn, states
have been hurt both by the recession and by the housing crisis, which
heightened the need for state transfers to local governments due to reduced
municipal property tax revenue.
Concerns that state and local government responses to their budget
difficulties might undermine federal stimulus efforts are also highlighted
by historical considerations.2 The classic paper by Cary Brown (1956)
shows that states did not conduct countercyclical policy during the Great
Depression. Subfederal governments still accounted for the majority of gov-
ernment spending during that era, and in the aggregate they tightened their
budgets between 1931 and 1933 and provided no net stimulus between
1933 and 1942.
Likewise, Kenneth Kuttner and Adam Posen (2001) show that during
Japan’s “lost decade,” ﬁscal efforts at the national level were inconsistent,
smaller than commonly thought, and undercut by a variety of factors.
Among these was that Japan’s announced public spending initiatives turned
out to be significantly larger than what ended up being implemented,
because many of the announced federal programs required partial local
1. In an analysis of provisions included in the 2009 federal stimulus package, the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce (2010) estimates output multipliers between 1.0 and 2.5 for trans-
fers to state governments for infrastructure spending, and between 0.7 and 1.8 for transfers
for other purposes.
2. The following two paragraphs are based on Auerbach and Gale (2010).
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with local government limited effective planning and implementation.
Hines’s paper begins with a demonstration that state activities in 
the recent downturn through 2009 provided virtually no net stimulus in 
the aggregate, after accounting for federal grants. Other researchers have
reported similar ﬁndings for the recent downturn (for example, Aizenman
and Pasricha 2010).
With this finding as background, the paper then investigates how state
policy has varied over the business cycle in the past, and reaches several
major conclusions. First, state-level fiscal policy is less countercyclical
than federal policy. This result is as expected, and although the results do
not show states running actively procyclical policies as suggested by the
simple balanced budget rule analysis above, they still imply that the impact
of federal countercyclical policies is smaller than it would be if states
acted exactly like the federal government.
Second, large states tend to have more procyclical policies than smaller
states. This result may seem backward at ﬁrst: one might expect larger
states to act more like the federal government (which can be thought of as
an aggregation of all states) and therefore to behave more countercycli-
cally than small states. However, Hines explains that because smaller states
face more elastic populations of taxpayers and businesses, they need to be
more responsive to local needs during downturns, and hence need to run
more countercyclical policies. In particular, state spending on education
and health, and revenue collected through the income tax, are more sensi-
tive to income ﬂuctuations in large states than in small states.
Third, most of the cyclical variation at the state level occurs through
changes in revenue rather than in spending. Aggregate state spending is not
particularly sensitive to income ﬂuctuations, but taxes are.
The fourth main result is that states have a high propensity to spend
federal grants, and this propensity is higher in large states than in small.
This is important given the key issue of whether federal grants to states
are stimulative. However, the extent to which grant levels are endogenous
with respect to state spending levels is difﬁcult to ascertain, which muddies
the interpretation.
Policymakers were seeking answers on these issues as they were con-
structing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the main
federal stimulus package in the recent recession. If and when another
stimulus package is debated, whether and in what form to extend aid to
the states will continue to be a critical question. At the same time, several
other issues would be worth exploring further. The ﬁrst is the sensitivity of
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Hines’s overall results to his use of the whole 1951–2007 time period. The
nation experienced only two recessions in the 20 years preceding 2007,
and the nature of the aggregate ﬁscal response to the business cycle changed
over that period (Auerbach, Gale, and Harris 2010). It would be interesting
to know how robust the results are to a divided sample period.
Second, if the focus is on understanding state responses during economic
downturns, it would be interesting to know whether the response to rises ver-
sus falls in income is asymmetric because of inertia or political constraints.
It is certainly plausible that the response of states to a recession is not the
exact opposite of their response to an expansion.
Another issue of interest is how, precisely, states run countercyclical poli-
cies, given their balanced budget rules. Do they exploit built-in features of
the rules (for example, a requirement that the budget be balanced, but only
on an ex ante basis)? Do they exploit the fact that such rules typically apply
only to the operating budget, so that debt-ﬁnanced capital expenditures, one
classic type of countercyclical policy, are still possible? Are they running
budget surpluses on average, building up reserves, and then draining their
rainy-day funds during hard times? Do federal grants in fact enhance their
ability to run countercyclical policies? Hines’s paper provides a foundation
from which future research could explore all of these issues.
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COMMENT BY
BRIAN KNIGHT In this paper, James Hines investigates differences
between state and federal ﬁscal responses to business cycle ﬂuctuations and
delves into cross-state differences in ﬁscal policy over the business cycle.
This is obviously an important topic given both the current economic cli-
mate and the ﬁscal challenges facing both the federal government and state
and local governments. Given this importance, I was surprised to learn that
Hines’s was the ﬁrst systematic comparison of federal and state-local ﬁscal
policy and thus was delighted to see him tackle this issue. I will ﬁrst sum-
marize his key ﬁndings before turning to some comments on the analysis
and a discussion of the results.
The paper’s analysis is divided into two parts. The first is a national
analysis of quarterly national income and product accounts data cover-
ing 1947–2010. Hines finds that federal spending and taxes exhibit the
expected countercyclical pattern, with spending rising and taxes falling
during recessions identiﬁed by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). This result is robust to using the output gap, as deﬁned by the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce, as an alternative measure of recessions. Hines’s
corresponding subnational measures of revenue and spending are based
on national aggregate data and combine the state and local sectors into
one. Using this measure, Hines finds some evidence of a countercyclical
pattern in state and local ﬁscal policy, but one that is smaller in magnitude
than the results for the federal government. The state and local results
are also less robust than the corresponding federal patterns to measures
based on the output gap. Taken together, the key finding from this first
analysis is that federal fiscal policy is more countercyclical than state
and local fiscal policy.
The second part of the paper is based on annual state-level Census
data covering the years 1951–2007. Thus, unlike the aggregate analysis,
this analysis excludes data from the most recent recession. Also, this
analysis incorporates spending and taxes from state governments alone
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ings here can be summarized as follows. First, fiscal policy does not dif-
fer between states with and states without strict balanced budget rules.
Second, there is a strong ﬂypaper effect: the marginal propensity of states
to spend from federal grants is close to 1, and about 25 times the marginal
propensity to spend from other sources of income. Third, state policy is
more countercyclical in states with small populations than in more pop-
ulous states. Hines interprets this finding as reflecting the fact that large
states face less competitive pressure, since voters in these states are less
likely to vote with their feet. That is, this pattern of procyclical policy in
large states may reﬂect the suboptimal propensity of politicians to spend,
rather than save, budget surpluses during economic booms, and pressures
to save any surpluses may be less relevant in large states. As corroborating
evidence for this “political failure” interpretation, Hines shows that, condi-
tional on population, ﬁscal policy is more procyclical in states with less
mobile populations, where voting with one’s feet is arguably more costly,
and in states with high levels of corruption, where these political failures
are presumably more salient.
I found the results from the ﬁrst analysis to be quite convincing in terms
of documenting that federal ﬁscal policy tends to be more countercyclical
than ﬁscal policy at the state and local level. This is certainly consistent
with normative principles, as outlined by Wallace Oates (1999), who argues
that, in most cases, stabilization policy is best carried out at the central level.
This result follows from the fact that state and local governments have open
economies and thus neither the means nor the incentives to counteract
economic downturns with expansionary fiscal policy. Although this is
the conventional wisdom in the federalism literature, Edward Gramlich
(1987), as discussed in more detail below, puts forward a case for a more
active macroeconomic stabilization policy at the state and local level.
Given Hines’s ﬁnding of a difference in countercyclicality between the
federal government and state and local governments, a natural question is
what the root causes of this difference might be. One possible answer is that
nearly all states have balanced budget rules, which, by limiting borrowing
during recessions, may constrain their ability to conduct countercyclical ﬁs-
cal policy. One weakness of this interpretation, however, is that it is seem-
ingly inconsistent with another of Hines’s ﬁndings, cited above, that state
ﬁscal policy is independent of the presence of strict balanced budget rules
at the state level. A second possibility derives from the fact that federal tax-
ation is largely based on income, whether individual or corporate, whereas
state and local tax bases are more based on sales and property. To the extent
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ing values, then, holding tax rates ﬁxed, federal tax revenue will automat-
ically exhibit more volatility over the business cycle than do state and
local tax revenues. Hines provides some evidence in favor of this hypoth-
esis in table 3, but the standard errors in these regressions are quite large,
making it difﬁcult to reject the hypothesis that revenues from income, sales,
and property tax systems at the state level exhibit similar patterns over the
business cycle.
A third possibility, mentioned above, is that because states are less
able than the federal government to prevent the benefits of their counter-
cyclical policy from spilling over to other jurisdictions, they have neither
the means nor the incentive to counteract a weak economy. But this idea is
inconsistent with Hines’s ﬁnding, also described above, that ﬁscal policy is
more countercyclical in less populous states, which presumably have more
open economies and thus less control over economic activity within their
borders than do larger states.
A ﬁnal possibility, not explored in the paper, is that federal tax systems
may be more progressive than state tax systems on average, and that this
greater progressivity builds greater countercyclicality into federal ﬁscal
policy. All else equal, reductions in individual income under a progressive
system tend to move taxpayers into tax brackets with lower tax rates and
hence lower tax payments.
As mentioned above, Hines also finds strong evidence of a flypaper
effect. In interpreting this result, however, some lessons from the exist-
ing literature on the flypaper effect are worth noting. First, many federal
grant programs have matching provisions. For example, the federal share
of Medicaid spending varies across states from a minimum of 50 percent,
consistent with a dollar-for-dollar federal match of state spending, to
around 75 percent, consistent with a 3-to-1 federal match. These substan-
tial matching provisions introduce significant substitution effects, and
consequently one should not expect the marginal propensity to consume
from grants to equal the marginal propensity to consume from income.
That is, the standard theoretical prediction of equivalence between grant
income and private income is based upon a model with purely lump-sum
federal grants. Indeed, Robert Mofﬁtt (1984) investigates this issue in the
context of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (the pre-
decessor of today’s Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and shows
that the ﬂypaper effect can be explained entirely by the program’s match-
ing provisions. Second, several recent papers, such as Brian Knight (2002),
Nora Gordon (2004), and Byron Lutz (2010), argue that the ﬂypaper effects
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That is, if federal funds tend to ﬂow to jurisdictions with strong prefer-
ences for public spending, then the observed ﬂypaper effects may reﬂect
the presence of this third factor. Moreover, results using exogenous varia-
tion in grant receipts tend to exhibit signiﬁcantly weaker ﬂypaper effects.
I found Hines’s results on the differences in ﬁscal policy between small
and large states to be quite interesting, and the idea that political failures of
ﬁscal policy are more salient in large states to be compelling. On the other
hand, when one combines this ﬁnding with the ﬁnding that federal ﬁscal
policy is more countercyclical, one is left with the puzzling result that it
is ﬁscal policy in small states rather than in large states that more closely
resembles federal fiscal policy. If differences between small states and
large states reﬂect the differing ability to vote with one’s feet, why is the
inability to save surpluses during booms not even more of an issue at the
federal level, where the population is even less mobile? This issue of dif-
ferences in ﬁscal policy between small and large states certainly deserves
further exploration.
Regarding this comparison, a potential statistical issue that is not dis-
cussed in the paper involves measurement error: any error associated with
measuring economic activity may be more pronounced in small states than
in large states. This might explain why state taxes and spending more
closely track state income in large states than in small states. Although
this differential measurement error seems unlikely to entirely explain the
differences in fiscal policy that Hines documents, it may lead to their
being overstated.
A related ﬁscal institution not explored in the paper is the rainy-day
fund, which, in the context of the author’s “political failure” story, can be
interpreted as a mechanism through which state governments can commit
to saving during economic booms for use during economic contractions.
Indeed, many of these funds have provisions designed to address political
failure. For example, some states require deposits into the rainy-day fund
during favorable economic times, and many allow withdrawals only dur-
ing downturns. Consistent with the idea that states are unable to commit
to saving during booms, Knight and Arik Levinson (1999) document that
contributions to these rainy-day funds tend to increase overall state savings
on a dollar-for-dollar basis and, moreover, that funds with stricter rules
regarding contributions and withdrawals tend to have higher overall sav-
ings than funds with more lax rules.
A ﬁnal issue that this paper raises involves regional business cycles.
The ﬁrst part of the paper is framed around the national business cycle and
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government and state and local governments. Yet because some shocks are
industry-speciﬁc, many recessions have important regional components or
might even be limited to one region. Consideration of such spatial varia-
tion in business cycles gives rise to a number of interesting issues that are
relevant to the paper’s results. First, states and localities may be in a better
position to respond to local economic shocks than the federal government:
state ofﬁcials may have better information about local economic conditions,
or, perhaps for political reasons, the federal government may be unable
to respond to highly localized economic shocks. Whatever the reason, the
better ability of states and localities to respond to local shocks suggests an
important role for state and local governments in macroeconomic stabi-
lization policy (Gramlich 1987).
Second, any federal response to localized economic downturns raises
moral hazard considerations. The expectation of increased federal funding
for states and localities in fiscal distress may provide incentives for them
to run excessive deficits and engage in other risky fiscal practices. To the
extent that the federal government cannot commit to not bailing out state
and local governments, strict balanced budget rules may be a necessary
ingredient of ﬁscal policy at the state and local level.
Third, federal automatic stabilizers provide a type of insurance against
regional contractions: relatively vibrant regions cross-subsidize regions suf-
fering from economic downturns, with the expectation that these roles will
be reversed when the economic conditions are reversed. In a careful exami-
nation of this issue, Pierfederico Asdrubali, Bent Sørensen, and Oved Yosha
(1996) document that about 13 percent of shocks to gross state product are
smoothed by federal ﬁscal policy, with federal taxes, transfers, and grants
all providing signiﬁcant contributions.
In summary, I found this to be a very interesting paper that makes a sig-
niﬁcant contribution to the literature on stabilization policy and federalism.
I hope that this paper will help to stimulate research in this area in the
coming years.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Alan Auerbach noted the lack of a distinc-
tion in the paper between automatic and discretionary responses. Presum-
ably some state programs, like some federal programs, are automatically
cyclical in their expenditure. It would be interesting to know whether the
variation found by Hines relates to differences in these types of programs
across states. Are states behaving differently because some but not others
are deliberately responding to recessions, or is everything on automatic
pilot, and do the differences across states have to do with different com-
positions of expenditure across these program types? Henry Aaron agreed
that the distinction is important, and he suggested that the hypothesis that
discretionary tax policy is almost unambiguously procyclical would soon
be tested in an effort by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities to mon-
itor virtually every proposed state tax increase.
Jonathan Parker argued that state income might not be the right depen-
dent variable. A state that cuts back a lot on spending may see a much
bigger rebound in income than one that cuts back little or not at all. Also,
very high income households account for a large amount of tax revenue in
some states. In New York, Wall Street bonuses alone accounted for about
$30 billion of state income in 2007, so that when bonuses fell by more than
half in 2008, it blew a multibillion-dollar hole in the state budget. This
raises the question of whether the recent high cyclicality of high incomes is
responsible. Parker noted that that would be the case only for states and
localities that rely on the income tax: a state that derives most of its rev-
enue from a progressive income tax is going to have higher revenue cycli-
cality than one that relies on a ﬂat consumption tax.
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found between larger and smaller states. Because of spillover effects, one
might have thought a priori that countercyclical spending policy, and espe-
cially discretionary spending, would be more effective in larger than in
smaller states. But then the differential would be in the opposite direction
from Hines’s ﬁnding, leading to the question: is the expected effect offset
by other factors?
Steven Davis wanted to see more evidence supporting the theory that
smaller states are more efﬁcient in their spending. For example, Hines’s
argument suggests that smaller states would have more efﬁcient court sys-
tems. Is this in fact the case? If the theory is correct, smaller states should
perform better on average than larger states on other attributes, too, even
the choice of tax base and the quality of public services.
Laurence Ball argued that it might be beneficial to consider a more
continuous measure of the business cycle, such as unemployment, rather
than a binary indicator like NBER recession dating. He suspected that
the results could be quite different. Justin Wolfers added that NBER
recessions are defined as times when the economy is getting worse, but
active fiscal policy is typically used both in the downswing and on the
rebound. Henry Aaron mentioned what he saw as a more fundamental
point. At least three of the recessions covered in the paper were caused
by cutbacks in defense outlays. This reverses the causation altogether
and undermines the relevance of the comparison between state and fed-
eral countercyclicality.
Wolfers also noted that when the federal government wants to respond
to economic weakness, it can respond forcefully. Much of the time,
however, the federal government does not respond at all, perhaps because
of politics or gridlock. Aggregating across all states, then, the response
of the states may be much more reliable than that of the federal govern-
ment. Politics has not yet entered into the discussion, but it certainly plays
a role.
Robert Hall pointed out that before the early 1960s it was illegal for
state and local employees to unionize. Public sector unionization has
become important only in recent decades, so that today a governor’s job
is to ﬁgure out how to make up the difference after powerful unions have
taken one large share of the revenue needed to balance the budget, and
stingy taxpayers have withheld another. In such an environment it is hard
to see how a state could possibly act countercyclically. Following up 
on Parker’s comment, Hall noted that another big change is the greater
dependence of many states on a progressive income tax, which gathers
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recessions was not the right way of looking at the issue. The need for stim-
ulus is after the end of a recession. A better analysis would be one that
compared bad times with good times.
Gary Burtless argued that the discussion of countercyclical stimulus
was incomplete without a consideration of the revenue side. As he under-
stood it, the single biggest element of automatic countercyclical stimu-
lus is the loss of income tax revenue from the corporate and personal
income tax.
Burtless was also interested in the treatment of unemployment insur-
ance and its allocation between state and federal responsibility. The UI
program is essentially mandated by the federal government, but states set
the benefit levels and the tax rates on employers to pay for the benefits.
An unambiguously discretionary part of policy is the decision whether
to provide extensions to UI during downturns. That is entirely a federal
initiative, mandated and funded by the federal government, although the
state governments write the checks. If such extensions are a large part of
what the paper is counting as state stimulus spending, it may not be an
accurate characterization.
Refet Gürkaynak was curious whether the difference that Hines observed
between small and large states would be found among small and large
member states of the European Union. The available history is not as long,
but it would be informative to see whether the smaller European states
have behaved differently from the larger ones during the last recession and
its aftermath.
Donald Kohn noted that the depth of the recent recession and the length
and severity of the output gap likely caused many states to run through
their rainy-day funds, even if they had built them up as planned. He also
wondered whether the dependence of most states on real estate taxes
made a difference in this cycle. Because this recession started and was
deepest in the real estate sector, the resulting steep loss in property taxes
might have cut into state revenue deeper and more quickly than in other
recessions. To the extent that states were constrained by a balanced bud-
get, this would have forced them to cut back spending more aggressively
than otherwise.
Robert Gordon observed that state and local real spending as a share
of potential GDP dropped sharply between 1931 and 1933 and contin-
ued to drop throughout the 1930s. Roughly half of the federal stimulus
in those years was thus offset by tightening at the state and local level,
even before including the tax side. The nation’s economic outlook was
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total government share of spending doubled with the surge in wartime
spending. In the recent period, the state and local share of potential GDP
has drifted downward steadily since 2003, but the federal government
has come nowhere close to offsetting this decline. In fact, it is hard to
see any increase in federal government spending on goods and services
through the second quarter of 2010. The spending has all been in trans-
fer payments, and most of that in unemployment insurance.
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